The project seeks to study several predictions of competitive insurance under asymmetric information. It will allow us to directly assess how the private mortality information of consumers and their experienced mortality, which will be derived from the survey, covaries with their prices and quantities of life-insurance held. First, whether there is any evidence for non-linear pricing other than that predicted by theory: the theory predicts that prices rise with quantity. Second, we will investigate how private mortality information and actual mortality risks covary with quantity; the theory predicts a positive covariation in that bad risks get more insurance than large risks. Lastly, we will attempt to evaluate what fraction of individuals hold multiple insurance contracts. This is important for the prediction that unit prices rise with quantity because multiple small contracts dominate.a large one under such prices. The proposed project will provide an increased understanding of the empirical relevance of commonly argued information barriers to trade in old-age insurance. Many times, these information barriers have provided the primary explanation for the lack of complete old-age insurance, especially among widows.